Just a fantastic consumer-friendly Order we have here in Dovberg v. Haller Enterprises, Inc., 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 241243 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 21, 2026)...
TCPA text message DNC and Caller ID case. The defendant texted the plaintiff twice, inviting him to refer friends and family to its business. The plaintiff hadn’t used the defendant’s services in about four years, so the texts were pretty much out of the blue despite plaintiff's number being listed on the National Do Not Call registry. Plaintiff's caller ID didn’t show the defendant’s name either, it just showed “MIDDLETOWN, PA.”
The plaintiff sued on behalf of a putative class. The defendant answered, then boldly moved for judgment on the pleadings with three arguments:
1. Texts aren’t calls;
2. Cell phones aren’t residential, and;
3. Nobody can sue over caller ID violations.
The Court rejected all three.
The residential argument went first. The Court put it simply: “Cell phone users who use their phones for personal use qualify as residential subscribers under the TCPA.” The reasoning started with the statute’s own words. Section 227(b) lists specific technologies, such as cellular telephones and residential telephone lines. Section 227(c) doesn’t. It protects residential telephone subscribers and their telephone numbers. Relying on Jackson v. Direct Building Supplies, the Court explained that if Congress wanted to limit do-not-call protection to landlines, it knew how to say so. It also cited Rubin v. Staples, which noted that § 227(c)(5) protects consumers “without regard to what type of line or telephone technology receives those calls.” The FCC’s own definition of a residential subscriber, one who “is not a business subscriber,” draws no line between cell phones and landlines.
On texts, the Court did its own statutory analysis and landed where three other courts in the district already had. Quoting Cole v. C/T Install America, it explained that a text “is sent via telephone in an attempt to communicate with another person.” It pointed to the TCPA’s definition of a telephone solicitation, which covers a “call or message.” It also cited the Supreme Court’s statement in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez that it is “undisputed” a text counts as a call. The defendant argued that “undisputed” only meant the parties in that case didn’t dispute it. The Court wasn’t persuaded.
Caller ID was the defendant’s last stand. The Court acknowledged that district courts are split on whether consumers can enforce the caller ID rule. It sided with Newell v. JR Capital, which held that a violation of the rule “is clearly a violation of regulations prescribed under” § 227(c). The defendant’s fallback was that it named itself in the body of the texts. That didn’t work either. A caller ID showing a town tells you nothing about who is texting, and the plaintiff “would have to open the text to see who sent the message.” Citing Novia v. Mobiz, the Court agreed that a name buried in the message doesn’t do the job caller ID is supposed to do.
Behind every ruling was the Third Circuit’s reminder in Gager v. Dell Financial Services: because the TCPA is remedial, “it should be construed to benefit consumers.”
The defendant asked for a referral. It got one, to federal court.
