"[T]here is reason to believe that either (a) the TCPA generally treats revocations over text as applying to calls as well, or (b) Plaintiff's particular text should have been understood as revoking consent to all forms of communication."
That's the key takeaway here from the order on motion to dismiss in Zagury v. Puragain Water, LLC, No. 26-cv-20454 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2026), where the Southern District of Florida largely denied a motion to dismiss claims under the TCPA and the FTSA. The plaintiff's residential number had been on the national do-not-call registry since 2006.
The consumer replied "Stop." Then, for good measure, "Remove." The defendant answered within seconds: "You have successfully opted out. Reply START to resubscribe."
She did not reply START. Over the next six weeks, her phone rang about nineteen times from the same company.
The defendant's central theory was that texts and calls are different animals. Revoking consent to text messages, it argued, says nothing about phone calls — and by mashing the two together, the complaint became an impermissible shotgun pleading.
The Court disagreed on the pleading point first. Incorporating a full factual background into each count is ordinary practice under Weiland v. Palm Beach County Sheriff's Office, and the supposed commingling problem was not a problem at all. It "merely reflects the legal contention that revocation of consent to texts also resulted in revocation of consent to calls."
Then the Court took up whether that contention holds. It started with the FCC's 2024 order, which states that when consent is revoked in any reasonable manner, "that revocation extends to both robocalls and robotexts regardless of the medium used to communicate the revocation of consent."
The defendant's answer was that the codified version of that rule, 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(a)(10), has a delayed effective date. The Court found three ways around it.
First, the FCC chose the word "confirm," which "implies that this is not a substantively new position, but an affirmation of what was already encompassed by previous regulation."
Second, and more concretely, the confirmation-text rule at § 64.1200(a)(12) was never delayed. It permits a single confirmation message, but only if the sender then ceases all further robocalls and robotexts absent an affirmative response — and silence must be treated as revocation across the board.
Third, the FCC has said since 2015 that a consumer may revoke consent "at any time and through any reasonable means," and whether "Stop" reasonably conveyed a desire to stop everything is a question of fact that cannot be sorted out on a motion to dismiss.
The consent defenses fared no better. Prior express invitation or permission must be evidenced by a signed written agreement. An established business relationship is defined as one "not previously terminated by either party." Both, the Court held, require facts not yet in the record.
The defendant did win one thing: the standalone count for knowing and willful violations was dismissed, since treble damages is "not a separate cause of action" but an enhancement already sought elsewhere in the complaint.
